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\FOREWORD
This study is part of a wider research project on "Capitalisation and
Proletarianisation in the Rural Areas of Ghana" undertaken in Ghana from
February 1979 to June 1980. While füll acknowledgement of all the institu-
tions and persons who have enabled me to carry out this research will be
included in the final report, I would like to single out those who have
specifically contributed to the present, first product of this research.
First of all I would like to thank the Afrika-Studiecentrum at Leiden
not only for financing the entire project but also for providing me with
excellent conditions for the writing-up of my fieldwork. Among my colleagues
at y»e Centre I am particularly endebted to: Dr. Gerrit Grootenhuis,
managing director, for continuous advice and encouragement; Mr. Joop Nijssen,
bursar, for taking care of the financial and administrative side of my
research; Drs. Wim van Binsbergen and Robert Buijtenhuijs for stimulating
intellectual exchange and comments on an earlier draft of this paper; and
Ria van Hal and Bert Dubbeldam for typing and producing the final version.
During my fieldwork in Ghana I received much support from: The
University of Ghana at Legon where I was appointed Research Fellow in the
Department of Sociology; the Ghana National Archives at Accra and Tamale;
the Irrigation Development Authority; the Labour Department; the Ghana
Trades Union Congress; the Upper Regional Administration; and the Frafra
District and Traditional Councils. I benefited greatly from the knowledge
and personal network of my research assistant, Mr. Martin Akannuemenema.
Mr. Freek Schiphorst made an in-depth study of one of the villages affected
by the Vea Irrigation Project; not only did we constantly exchange field-
work experiences but we also became close friends. At various occasions I
enjoyed the hospitality of the Catholic Mission in Ghana, in particular
the White Fathers and the Society of African Missions. My greatest debt
lies with the peasants in the Vea Irrigation Project who entrusted me with
writing their history and making it known in Ghana and elsewhere.
I dedicate this study to the memory of my father who died during my
fieldwork on the Vea Irrigation Project.
Leiden, September 1980.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Vea Irrigation Project, a medium-sized Irrigation project in
the Upper Region of Ghana, was one of the schemes undertaken by the post-
colonial state to bring about structural changes in the colonial export
economy and to bridge regional inequalities.
The ^ project aimed at and established a shift in local peasants'
incorporation in the national and international market. It transformed
local peasants in various ways from migrant labourers to the South
Ghanaian export economy into (local) producers of cash crops for the
national (or, more accurately, the South Ghanaian) and (hopefully) the
international market, thus achieving what contradictory colonial economie
policies visualized but never could fully realize:
"The importance of Northern labour (for the Southern export economy,
P.K.) has been mentioned, but it is on the food markets of the
South that Northern economy in the future should depend... Whether
the North at a later stage could become an exporter of food to the
world market is, at this stage, purely a matter of conjecture". (1)
It will be argued tbat the project was not primarily planned (and has
not worked out) in the interest of (at least, most) local peasants, but
in the interest of the state in the continued control and exploitation
of Northern labour for capital accumulation and food supplies in the
South.
This study tries to demonstrate first why the project aimed at a
transformation of producers of use-values and migrant labourers into
producers of commodities and how this transformation was achieved. 11
then tries to explain the reasons for the various consequent changes in
the Organisation of cash erop production in the project and to analyse
the various ways peasants' labour is controlled and exploited. And finally
it shows peasants' reaction and action towards the loss of control over
the means of production, production process and terms of exchange.
2. DOMESTIC COMMUNITY'S COLONIAL FUNCTION: SUPPLY AND REPRODUCTION OF
CHEAP LABOUR
The Vea Irrigation Project area is situated some 10 km. to the north-
west of Bolgatanga, the capital of the Upper Region, and is part of the
Frafra Traditional Area. The project covers 7 villages, partly under the
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jurisdiction of the (divisional) chief of Bolgatanga (Zaare, Yikine,
Yorogo, Sumbrungu and part of Nyarega) partly under the jurisdiction
of the (divisional) chief of Bongo (Vea, Gowrie and part of Nyarega).
(see maps l, 2 and 3)
The_inhabitants of those villages were largely dependent on the
land for "fheir subsistence. Lands belong to the ancestors and allodium
is vested in the tindana, the "custodian of the land" and "priest of
the earth god", (2) in the Bolgatanga division, and in the chief in the
Bongo division (where the tindana has only a religious function). (3)
Chief or tindana allotted land to the patrilineal clans within their
jurisdiction; once the right of ownership of land has been vested in
a clan It cannot be revoked. Farmland is held by the family head who
owes his positjon to genealogical seniorlty. He can call upon the labour
power of all family members and can dispose of the product of family
labour. He is, however, obliged to provlde fairly for the needs and
wants of those who share the farm work. Control over labour of young
men by the family head is assured by "monopolistic control of religious
power and access to marriage via bridewealth, gained through stewardship
of ritual sacra and lineage herds". (4) The family head may portion out
the land among the (married) male members of the family. When hè dies,
the land is divided up amongst his male children, thus creating a
Situation in which land is excessively fragmented. Female members of
the family have no rïghts over land, but women may acquire temporary
possession of land from their husbands, friends or relatives on which
they can cultivate such cash crops as groundnuts, potatoes or rice. In
return, they are expected to provide ingredients like pepper, salt or
even meat for the family meal from the income obtained from such farms.
Mouton's observation about 1 he Mamprusi sums up in a striking manner
the quintessence of the traditional land tenure Systems prevalent in the
North and which is equally applieable to the Frafra: "The idea of selling
land or of making a man live without it cannot be even understood by the
people, a man having as much right to it as, say, to his arms or legs.
This tends to lessen the food crops available for sale, as individual
men naturally prefer to work their own plot for their own food and a
very small surplus, than to engage as hired labourers to make big farms
for a few men to seil and make money". (5) Land among the Frafra had no
commercial value and land was always generously given to any person whose
clan lands were exhausted and even to strangers (though strangers could
-3-
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t
never acquire ownerahip of land) who had to sustain themselves and their
dependents. This custom is maintained though land in this area of the
Upper Region is in short suppTy. Population density is extremely high,
exceeding in one estimation 450 per square miIe in a large part of the
project area. (6) Fragmentation of land through the existing inheritance
pattern, rapidly deteriorating soil conditions and erosion contribute to
the increasing land shortage. Lynn found in 1932-36 that the average
peasant cultivated 2.49 acres in the area, which was only enough to
support 3.7 persons (7); my research in 1979 seems to support Adu's
estimated average 2 acre landholding in the project area before the con-
struction of the dam. (8) Shortage of land, combined with declining
soil fertility, increasing erosion, the low and unreliable rainfall,
and simple production techniques (the general use of the hoe, dibble
stick and cutlass, though some bullock plougbs were introduced in the
area during the colonial period) make each successive year's survival
precarious. Most people have to accept that during the period of peak
labour demand (the time before harvest) they will have barely enough
to survive on and that in a year of a disaster (drought, invasion of
locusts) they will suffer famine. (9)
Local peasants have not only developed a stock of religious beliefs
to cope with the hostile ecosystem, they have also demonstrated a great
sense of adaptation and innovation:
- Esther Boserup's thesis that population pressure will lead to an
intensificatlon of agriculture certainly applies to this area. (10)
Shortage of land has forced local peasants to a more intensive (per-
manent cropping system) and more diverse (mixed cropping) use of the
compound farm (as the extended compound farm or bush farm are mostly
not available). It is only recently that the scientific community
haa discovered the many benefits of the mixed cropping system, inclu-
ding higher yields, more even spreading of labour, soil protection
and fertility, and pest and disease control. (11) The variety of
crops grown comprise the staples millet and guinea corn which have
social and religious significance (12) mixed with all kinds of vege-
tables and sometimes groundnuts, sorghum and rice, and provide for
all family needs.
- Besides farming, most peasants keep sheep, chickens, guinea-fowls and
cattle for consumption and sale in time of need. Cattle are parti-
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cularly valued and the number of cattle is a visible sign of a per-
son's prosperity and determines his social status. Cattle have many
functions. Cattle are kept as a self-improving Investment or Insu-
rance against sudden need, calamity or hard times, serving as bridal
dowries and gifts and slaughtered for funerals, occasional feasts
and festivals. Cattle supply manure vital for the permanent cropping
system practised in the area. The ease with which cattle (bullocks)
were accepted for cultivation purposes in the colonial period once
more demonstrates the peasants' sense of innovation; the general use
of bullocks is only prohibited by the high costs involved. Finally,
as Polly Hill observed, contrary to the common statement that pea-
sants in Northern Ghana do not or only rarely seil their cattle,
all peasants - though peasants in our study area may be somewhat
more reluctant - were willing and ready to seil male animals from
their herds to traders and butchers. (13)
- The seasonality of agricultural labour requirements and the uneven
demands of the farming schedule gave rise to all kinds of specia-
lisms and secondary occupations which provide extra income during
the agricultural off-season or command labour services during the
agricultural season. Roofing and hut specialists were busily en-
gaged in the dry season to bui ld new houses or repair the damages
caused by the wet season. Women were experienced brewers and sel-
lers of Dito, the local beer. Diviners and similar ritual and me-
dical specialists were well awarded for their services. Many men
and women were specialists in weaving, pottery, leather and metal
work and other crafts. While some of the goods produced were for
own use (blacksmiths used to supply peasants with all farm imple-
ments), many of them served trading purposes. The favourable geo-
graphical postition of Northern Ghana with regard to the long dis-
tance trade between the South of Ghana and Northern Nigeria and
North Africa promoted trading and the production of eraft items.
The ecosystem and society (redistributive mechanisms) did not
allow much differentiation. (14) Besides the chief and (to a lesser
extent) the tindana who were entitled to communal labour for the cul-
tivation of their farms and to a share in the community's farm pro-
duce, only very few men could hope to rise to the status of "nera
gu'la", the "rieh man". This success could only be achieved by a
man who could command the labour of a large number of wives, chil-
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dren and various compulsory (son-in-laws with their friends) and vol-
untary (which demanded considerable expenses in the Provision of food
and drinks and have increasingly acquired a cash nexus) working groups
(15), possessed substantial herds, possibly earned supplementary in-
come from specialization in crafts, and undoubtedly engaged in trading
of sorae kind. Moreover, such a person was more often than not a line-
age elder. (16) ^
The dornestic Community was incorporated into the national and
international market as a supplier of cheap labour to the Southern
export economy by the colonial power. (17) The colonial power's con-
sideration that the North lacked any other important natural resour-
ce outside its labour power, capable of supplying the Southern ex-
port economy's growing demand for labour, gave rise to a deliberate
strategy to transform the region into a reservoir of cheap labour for
the mines and cocoa farms in the South. (18) Labour had initially to
be forced out of the North by the colonial regime with the assistan-
ce of chiefs (often created by the colonial regime), (19) but various
administrative measures were taken to promote a "voluntary" flow of
labour to the South. These included starving of the North of develop-
ment funds (for instance, for a long time no funds were available
to raise agricultural production) and attempts to discourage or de-
stroy any economie activity which could supplement the subsistence
economy (e.g. attempts to cultivate cash crops were discouraged by
the colonial power despite local peasants' initial enthusiasm). Con-
trol over lands in the North attained by colonial land laws which
are of particular importance for our further discussion enabled the
colonial regime not only to curb the growth of a land market but
also to impede the development of capitalist relations in agricul-
ture and other sectors of the economy which could have threatened
the export of cheap Northern labour to the Southern export economy.
The importance the colonial regime attached to a secure flow
of labour from the North to the South seems to a large extent to
emplain its renewed attempt to vest Northern lands in the state
after earlier failure in the South. (20). Succes in the North was
achieved by the absence of those factors which roused Opposition
in the South: the absence of any commercial value attached to land
and the absence of an educated elite who can mobilise chiefs and
people. The 1931 Land an Native Rights Ordinance vested the mana-
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gement, control and administration of Northern lands in the governor
in trust for the people, which legal terminology cannot be assimilated,
though this has been and still is often purposely done by bureaucrats
and politicians, with "ownership" or "nationalization" of Northern
lands. (21) The Act empowered the governor to grant rights of occupancy
to natives and non-natives and to extract a rent in respect of rights
of occupancy so granted. One of the far-reaching effects of the ordi-
nance was that in practice the Lands Department, which manages the
lands in the North, could claim any land for "development purposes"
without equltable compensation and lease it to any Ghanaian. Attempts
by the Northern Territories Council (NTC) to take over control over
lands in the North from the governor failed in the fifties. (22) The
reluctance of the colonial government to surrender control over lands
in the North demonstrates the government's continued fear that loss of
control over lands in the North would lead to Ijss of control over the
flow of labour to the South.
The flow of labour to the South, initially a product of simple
coercion, was kept going and actually increased by the neglect of
transformatlon of precarious peasant agriculture, the prevention of
employment opportunities in the North outside subsistence agriculture
and the growing need for cash created by the colonial economy. Portes
speaks of a Frafra adult male absentee rate of between 7 and 15 per
cent depending on the time of the year in the thirties. (23) At the
end of the colonial period 30.5% of the men and 14% of the women of
the Frafra ethnic group were away from home. (24)
While mainly women and older men continued to take care of agri-
cultural production, thus providing capital in the South with the
benefit of a cheap reproduction of labour, the absence of a large
number of able-bodied men must have had a detrimental effect on agri-
cultural production. Even so, foodstuffs were at times sucked out of
the North by the lure of high food prices in Southern towns, creating
absolute food-shortages in the North during periods of high demand in
the South. (25) Moreover, those who profited most from the high food
prices were not so rauch Northern producers as Southern traders who
bought the produce in the North. Exploitation of Northerners by
Southerners at the level of production (cheap labour) and exchange
(buying foodstuffs below their value and selling them at, or above,
their value) in colonial times tended to reinforce and even to deepen
the pre-colonial conflict between Northerners and Southerners based
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on Ashanti's extraction of tribute and control over trade in commodities
and slaves in the North. (26)
Meillassoux has rightly pointed out the inherent contradiction in
the System: the domestic Community's function of supplying labour to the
capitalist system must inevitably endanger its function of reproducing
this labour power as food production tends to decrease or at least to
stagnate. (27) The acknowledgement of the "food problern" as a threat not
only to the economy (the reproduction of labour) but also to the polity,
the regime itself, as food prices in Southern towns dangerously sky-
rocketed, (28) gave rise to more extensive state Intervention and invest-
ment in agriculture starting in the thirties and culminating after the
Second World War.
Initially the government tried to solve the food problem by some
(modest) attempts to improve peasant production in the Frafra area. The
thirties witnessed the establishment of an Agricultural Station at
Zuarungu with a limited agricultural research and extension programme;
there was the introduction of mixed farming through the use of animal
traction and some attention was paid to vetinerary services. Moreover,
the government tried to "ease" the population problem in the Frafra
area, which it considered one of the main reasons for low agricultural
production. Various (small) resettlement schemes were introduced to s
move peasants from the densely populated Frafra area to the sparsely
populated areas of Northern Ghana but all met with limited success and
were abandoned. (29) After the Second World War, when Southern towns
were hit by extensive food shortages and high food prices, the govern-
ment concluded that peasant production could not meet urban demands:
emphasis was shifted to large-scale, capital-intensive agricultural
schemes. While the colonial government had "killed" peasant production
by luring the best labour (young, able-bodied men) away from agriculture
and by pursuing a policy of low Investment (during the whole colonial
period only £ l-l§m. was invested in peasant production) (30), it over-
staffed (with the best qualified personnel) and invested almost the
same amount in one ambitious scheme, the Gonja Development Corporation,
between 1950 and 1957. (31)
The scheme involved the resettlement of a relatively small number
of peasants mainly from the Frafra area to the sparsely populated area
of Gonja (32), acquainting them, under management supervision, with
cashcropping by mechanical methods on a 30-acre plot (distributed to
each participant). The Gonja scheme, like previous resettlement schemes,
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faced many problems with settlers, like persuading the Frafra to leave
their cherished, if impoverished land, and keeping them involved in the
scheine when conflicts developed with the Indigenous Gonja. Settlers,
however, turned enthusiastically to cashcropping when their food supply
was assured on a 2 acre plot around their new houses and traditional
religious customs with regard to agriculture were preserved. The pro-
ject proved a dismal failure with regard to increased food production
because of the many problems facing large-scale mechanisation in Northern
Ghana, overstaffing and managerial problems. The CPP, however, that took
over the reins of government by the time of the dissolution of the Gonja
scheme, completely overlooked the lesson of Gonja and continued to rely
mainly on large-scale and capital-intensive schemes instead on improved
peasant production to increase agricultural production.
3. DOMESTIC COMMUNITY'S POST-CQLONIAL FUNCTION: PRODUCTION OF CASH CROPS
At the beginning of the sixties, the post-colonial state feit for
the first time the füll impact of one of the colonial economy's sharpest
contradictions: the over-emphasis of cocoa production to the detriment of
the production of food and other agricultural,raw materials. The drastic
fall in the cocoa prices and the increasing Imports of food and agri-
cultural raw materials largely reduced Ghana's foreign exchange, en-
dangering its industrialization programme. High food prices in the
Southern towns was one of the main causes of the 1961 Sekondi-Takoradi
railway strike which was the first serious threat to the post-colonial
state and the party in power. (33) The government seriously considered
a revision of agricultural policy: attention had to be redirected from
cocoa to the production of food crops to feed the rapidly growing non-
agricultural population especially in the South and raw materials to
supply the expanding manufacturing sector. (34) The substantial increase
in agricultural production was to be primärily achieved, according to
the Seven Year Development Plan, by the establishment of large-scale,
mechanised state enterprises, which could serve as "shining examples
of progress" to peasant farmers, and secondarily by an improvement or
even a transformation of the production and Organisation of the peasantry,
especially in the North of Ghana, badly neglected by colonialism. (35)
The Vea Irrigation Project was to be an expression of the CPP's
determination to provide the North with a l arger share of the develop-
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ment funds than ever bad been the case in the colonial period and to
"repay" Northern labour for its contribution to the growth of the
Southern export economy. (36) The project was to be a large-scale,
mechanised farming scheme which would transform local peasants into
producers of cash crops best suited to Irrigation conditions, which
could supply the national and possibly the international market. W.A.
Amoro, MP for Bongo, told parliamentarians that by irrigating the area
"the government would be killing three birds with one stone. First the
tomatoes that would be produced would be sufficient to meet the re-
quirements of the people and the Pwalugu Tomato Processing factory.
Secondly, the rice that would be produced would be sufficient to meet
the needs of the whole country and so we would conserve foreign ex-
change, since we would no longer import rice. And the last but not the
least, is that the people would have sufficient money to buy clothing
for their families". (37)
It is clear from the parliamentarian's words that the project was
primarily planned to feed the newly established tomato-processing
factory at Pwalugu (one of the very few industrial enterprises esta-
blished in the Upper Region during the CPP regime) and the regional
rice-mills which could supply the petty bourgeoisie and (to a lesser
extent) workers in the Southern towns who had acquired a "colonial"
taste for rice. The reduction in import of food and agricultural raw
materials would certainly conserve foreign exchange, but possible ex-
port would even enable the state to gain foreign exchange that could
be used in industrializing the South. Obviously the project was not
geared to the improvement of the domestic Community's precarious food
production. On the contrary, it aimed at the destruction of the domestic
community's food production (and grazing land for livestock and cattle),
thus forcing peasants into commodity production in order to maintain
themselves and their household members, and increasing management
control over the project (by making it impossible for peasants to
withdraw and revert to food production). The domestic community's
"colonial" function, supply and reproduction of labour to the capita-
list System, was no longer required and had to be replaced by a new
one: production of cash crops. The slowly expanding manufacturing
sector in the South, capital-intensive in character, had to a large
extent lost interest in (and could no longer absorb) the cheap, un-
l
l
l
l
I
l
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skilled migrant labour from the North and wanted to create a stable
and skilied Proletariat (38) which could only be found in the South
as colonialism had systematically deprived the North of educational
opportunities. (39) Capitalism was now more interested in a further
peasantisation rather than in a further proletarianisation of Northern
labour power (40): the supply of raw materials to the agro-industry
and the supply of cheap food, keeping wages low and workers quiet in
the South, would go far to meet the demands of rapid industrialization.
The parliamentarian's contention that the introduction of Irriga-
tion would not only lead to increased food supplies and capital accu-
mulation by the state, but also to an improvement in "transformed"
peasants' living Standard is very much open to question. Though mar-
keting of cash crops by state corporations would ensure the peasantry
a market for their crops, prices offered by state corporations were
often lower than those by Southern raiddlemen, who used to be regularly
attacked by the CPP as "exploiters" of the peasantry and the main
cause of high food prices in the Southern towns. (41) Having sold
/ their crops to the state corporations below their value, peasants
would be left in the hands of those "exploiters" to buy their food-
stuffs far above their value. Paraphrasing Shepherd: if the project
set the peasantry on the path of a new development, it was not so
much a path determined by peasants' interests as well by Southern
urban interests and the logic of Southern capital accumulation. (42)
4. DOMESTIC COMMUNITY'S EXPROPRIATION OF LANDS (AND PROPERTY): MEANS
TO TRANSFORM DOMESTIC COMMUNITY INTO A PRODUCER OF CASH CROPS
Colonial land laws enabled the colonial state to force labour
out of the North; colonial J and laws enabled the post-colonial state
to force peasants Into cash erop production by expropriating their
lands for "development purposes". Colonial land laws again enabled
the CPP to claim peasants' lands without individual compensation,
thus reducing project's costs considerably. However, the CPP never
foresaw that the transition from land expropriation to cash erop pro-
duction would be a prolonged and painful process and that the same
colonial land laws would be used (by its successors to power) to
dishonour its promise of leasing the developed lands to the ex-
propriated.
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Work on the project started in 1965 but the construction of the
dam and canals and land development was not only shoddily done but
also "at a snail pace" by Ghanaian private and state contractors,
greatly increasing the estimated project costs. (43) Only 120 ha
out of the originally planned 1660 ha (4100 acres) project had been
developed in 1976, when the state awarded a new contract on favourable
terms to a British multinational, Taylor Woodrow (International) Ltd.,
to complete the project, including rehabilitation of a section of ear-
lier construction works. (44) Changes in the hastily prepared original
plan by Taylor Woodrow reduced the land to be developed to 760 ha. (45)
Despite many setbacks and delays mainly due to the almost complete
collapse of the Ghanaian economy since 1976, land development reached
520 ha during my research in 1979. The project is due to be completed
in 1980. (46)
The construction and development works a-fected peasants' lands
and houses situated in the project area. Lands were expropriated with-
out compensation, but peasants were promised that lands would be leased
to them after the project's completion and their temporary suffering
(no land) would be more than compensated by the acquisition of high
yielding irrigated lands. Those peasants who were actually living
in the project area were asked to resettle and compensation would
be paid for the loss of their houses. Table l shows the number of
households in the various villages that lost their houses and the
compensation paid; the number of people resettled are estimated at
between 4000 and 6000.
Resettlement schemes in Africa in general clearly demonstrate
the position of peasants in the colonial and post-colonial society
marked as they are by lack of peasant consultation and surrounded
with fraud, threats and force by bureaucrats. (47) Though previous
resettlement schemes in Ghana, in particular the huge Volta River
Project Resettlement Scheme in the beginning of the sixties, (48)
had provided Ghanaian bureaucracy with invaluable resettlement ex-
perience, the Vea Resettlement Scheme adds another black page to
previous resettlement schemes. The original plan of the Vea Resettle-
ment Committee was to resettle the households affected in new re-
settlement townships (49) which would be provided with all kinds of
amenities to introducé peasants to "modern life". (50) However,
-15-
Table 1. Number of Households Affected and Compensation Paid
Compensation
paid in
1968
1973
1976
Village
Sumbrungu
Vea
Yikine
Zaare
Yorogo
Gowrie
Nyarega
Nyarega
Vea
Nyarega
TOTAL
Number of
Households
194
17
62
86
20
14
107
26
1
39
566
Amount of Compensa-
tion in JZ2)
55,796.00
4,086.00
6,355.00
19,538.00
4,306.00
3,729.00
29,923.00
10,115.00
175,937.00
309,785.00
Source: Compiled from files in the Lands Department, Bolgatanga.
Notes: 1. The figure of 566 households may be not correct. Other
sources speak of 660 households affected and compensated
in 1968. See Aganah, S.A., The Vea (Yaratanga River)
Irrigation Project: An Appraisal of Farming Innovation,
B.A. thesis, Department of Geography, University of
Ghana, Legon, 1972» p. 41; and file FBC 12/SF.5.
2. Ghanaian ccdi was almost at par with the American dollar
in 1968; its (official) value was equal to US $ 0.78 in
1973 and to US $ 0,87 in 1976.
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while the state built bungalows and houses for project managers and
workers, the Vea Resettlement Committee was informed that lts plan
was unacceptable because of the high cost involved. Individual cora-
pensation would be paid to peasant households affected and it was
left to them to find a place to resettle and build a house. The com-
pensation paid to those households in 1968, ranging from (2 40 to
£ 800 per household, was by no means enough to pay for putting up
a new building, and peasants were forced to use their small savings,
seil their livestock and cattle and call upon their friends and
relatives to enable them to build.
None of the peasants had any idea about the evaluation criteria
and the amount to be paid. No official receipts were issued confirm-
ing that they actually received the amount indicated on the evalua-
tion list. A petition presented by the Frafra Youth Movement in 1977
concluded: "We really cannot teil whether this *.s an administrative
flaw or there was a reason. Whatever it is, we question the genuine-
ness of the whole payment exercise". (51) Some peasants explained
that at times they were threatened not to teil anybody the amount
they had been paid. Peasants who dared to complain about the low
compensation were either blatantly told to accept the money or leave
it or made to understand that they had no claim as the money was
paid on humanitarian grounds. In Sumbrungu one clan clashed with the
chief who openly took a part of each peasant's compensation money;
the chief retaliated by having those "agitators" beaten and locked
up by the police and eventually forced them to leave the village. As
their chiefs, considered by peasants and state alike as the repre-
sentatives and spokesmen of the people, did not protest, peasants
generally saw no other way out than grumblingly to accept the low
compensation. Only very few refused to accept the compensation and/or
to leave the house of their ancestors and gods till they were forcibly
removed. Peasants not informed about the time-limit found themselves
surprised by a bulldozer which threatened to demolish their property.
The resettlement exercise resulted in family breakdowns due to in-
ability to put up a house which could contain all the family members
and to serious quarrels about the sharing of whatever compensation
was paid. (52)
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Some peasants were so shocked by the loss of their houses and
lands and/or terrified by the display of force during the resettle-
ment exercise that they left the area as shown by table 2.
As can be seen from table 2, the decrease in population from
20,709 in 1948 to 18,958 in 1960 represented a decrease of 8.4%,
while the decrease between 1960 and 1970 was 35.6% which is about
four times the original decrease. This demonstrates that instead
of halting the "traditional" flow of labour, the project must have
increased the flow of labour drastically due to peasants' dislocation
by the expropriation exercise.
Most displaced peasants, however, begged their relatives or
friends for a plot to cultivate and settle on, thus exacerbating
the already existing land shortage. While their demand was "customarily"
met, the plot acquired was much too small for them to exist on. The al-
most complete destruction of peasants' food prcJuction by the expropria-
tion exercise made peasants to a large extent dependent on the market
for obtaining their food supply: peasants were again forced to seil
their remaining livestock and cattle, depriving them of their "tradi-
tional" insurance against hard times, to turn eraft production from a
seasonal into a year-round activity or to compete for wage-labour
opportunities that were opened up by the development of the North in
general and the project area in particular: not only the construction
works in the project area demanded an increasing number of labourers
but also nearby Bolgatanga, the newly created and quickly expanding
capital of the Upper Region. Some peasants in the project area tried
to combine all the mentioned activities in the struggle for survival.
The most important consequences of state's expropriation of
peasants' lands and houses, prolonged by the slow progress of con-
struction and development works, were:
- Peasants' increasing impoverishment as a result of the almost com-
plete destruction of their food production (and grazing land) and
a feeling of dejection. The Frafra Youth Movement described the Situa-
tion of most peasants affected by the project as follows in 1977: "What
the Frafra Youth Movement discovered is shocking. Malaria fever (as the
dam lake and canals became breeding grounds for mosquitoes, P.K.), un-
balanced diet or not getting the food at all, coupled with the psycho-
logical violence of feeling that one is landless is now the lot of
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Table 2. Population of Villages in the Vea Project Area, 1948-1970
POPULATION BY YEAR
V ILLAGE
Sumbrungu
Yikine
Z aar e
Yorogo
Nyarega
Vea
Gowrie
TOTAL
1948
7,072
1,285
2,287
3,932
752
2,840
2,541
20,709
1960
7,762
1,656
1,047
1,795
839
3,409
2,450
18,958
1970
4,438
1,037
1,9471)
870
2,680
1,246
12,218
Source: Ghana Population Censuses, 1948, 1960 and 1970, vol. II.
Note: 1. Zaare is situated at the outskirts of Bolgatanga and had
its population increased due to Bolgatanga's rapid
urbanization.
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people of Gowrie and Vea. This has been aggravated by the absence of
a health center. Decent living is a forgotten phase in those areas". (53)
-Peasants ' "liberation" from the land and increasing dependence on a
cash-income opened the way for the various ways peasants would be in-
corporated as cashcroppers in the national and international market:
proletarianisation and commodity production. Colonial land laws again
determined peasants' fate. Those laws authorizing the state to lease
lands in the North to any Ghanaian enabled the military and bureaucra-
tie regimes which succeeded the CPP into power to jump over the CPP's
promise of leasing the developed lands to the expropriated and use the
developed lands to secure an economie base in Ghanaian society and pro-
mo t e private entrepreneurship in agriculture. (54) Overnight, peasants
were transformed into proletarians on their own lands. Moreover, the
entrepreneurs who were allocated lands by the state were mainly
Southerners. The transfer of the traditional conflict between Southern
capital and Northern labour to the North tended to deepen this conflict.
5. THE DOMESTIC COMMUNITY AS PRODUCER OF CASH CROPS FOR THE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL MARKET
The 1966 military coup not only eliminated the CPP regime, but
also attempted to overhaul its ideology and policies. The CPP's suc-
cessors to power ignored the previous regime's promise of leasing the
developed lands in the project area to local peasants and started to
allocate lands to "commercial farmers". It was only in 1977 that the
second military regime, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), honoured
the CPP's promise by re-allocating (most of) the developed lands to
local peasants. The following section will discuss the reasons for
changes in the land allocation policy and Organisation of production
by the post-coup regimes and their effect upon local peasants1 incor-
poration as cash-croppers into the national and international market:
peasants' position in the process of production changed from prole-
tarians and outgrowers in the period 1968 - 1978/79 to peasants con-
trolled and regulated by the Irrigation Development Authority (IDA)
afther the re-allocation of lands in 1978/79.
-20-
5.1. Proletarians and Outgrowers
The military-bureaucratie regime, the National Liberation Council
(1966-69) and its successor, the liberal-democratic Progress Party
regime (1969-72) tried hard (but were never fully able) to dismantle
state controls and participation in the economy, liberalize the eco-
nomy and promote private enterprise. Both regimes considered the es-
tablishment of large-scale private farming a necessary prerequisite
to boost agricultural production and exhorted civil servants, in par-
ticular agricultural officers and businessmen, to move into capita-
list agricultural production.(54) The state farm as the national
ideal of progress was superseded by the image of the dynamic entre-
preneur, stimulated by all kinds of tax-benefits, allocation of low
interest loans, subsidized imputs supply and government fixed
market prices for agricultural products. A similar "entrepreneurial"
approacb in agricultural extension services was developed by inter-
national aid organisations like FAO, USAID and the Ghanaian-German
Agricultural Development Project (GGADP) with their concentration
on "key farmers". (56) Extension officers of the Vea Irrigation Pro-
ject advised the NLC and PP-regimes to lease the developed lands
to "enterprising commercial farmers" after the failure of a few Irri-
gation trials with local peasants.
After the construction of the dam in 1968 a few attempts were made
by a state Corporation, the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC),
owner of the tomato processing factory at Pwalugu, and the Irrigation
Division to introducé local peasants into the production of cash crops
under irrigation conditions. In those experiments a few hundred pea-
sant volunteers grouped on the basis of clan affiliation were brought
together on a 200 acre developed land to grow tomatoes and rice under
the supervision of irrigation officers. (57) Peasants were provided
with inputs, ploughing and extension services by GIHOC and the Irri-
gation Division. Those experiments did not prove to be very success-
fui. First of all, extension services were not up to the Standard
required to familiarize local peasants with irrigation techniques and
rules. Secondly, while peasants were quite willing to participate in
the experiment in the dry season, they were unwilling in the wet sea-
son as they wanted to grow food on their small compound plots. Final-
ly, peasants most resisted having to seil the fruits of their labour
I
l
l
l
I
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to management for very low prices (varying from JZ 0.50 to 0 2 for a
bag of rice). (58)
On the basis of these half-hearted experiments, Irrigation of-
ficers jumped to the conclusion that local peasants were not enligh-
tened enough, not even willing to undertake rice and tomato cultiva-
tion under irrigation conditions. They advised the government to lease
the lands to "progressive" farmers who could serve as "guides" to
local peasants. Their advice was readily accepted by the state; and
so since 1971 a Vea Land Allocation Comraittee made up of regional
top civil servants and the Bolga-naba (divisional chief of Bolgatanga)
(59) started to allocate land in the project to mainly petty-bour-
geois elements in society (civil servants, professionals, military
and police officers, traders and businessman), mostly absentee rice-
farmers, and to state corporations engaged in food production. Table
3 shows a breakdown of land allocation in the Vea Project during
the 1978-79 irrigation season, when re-allocation of lands to local
peasants had already started and some commercial farmers had already
left the area. It is striking from table 3 that whilst peasants who
legally (22 so-called settler farmers) or illegally (about 400 pea-
sants who squatted on undeveloped land but were constantly threatened
with eviction) occupied land in the project area cropped all their land,
commercial farmers and state corporations cropped only a small portion
of their (developed) lands. Peasants, however, were not allowed to erop
on this fallow land. Of course, commercial farmers and state corpora-
tions wanted to maintain a pool of landless peasants to guarantee a
regulär supply of cheap labour.
Commercial farmers and all state corporations except GIHOC operated
almost exclusively along the left bank of the main canals (near the
villages Gowrie and Yorogo), where lands were most fertile, wholly or
partially developed and suitable to rice production. Commercial farmers
were mostly Southerners, whose main occupation was in the civil service,
armed and police forces, or business in Bolgatanga, but attracted to
large-scale rice farming as it required lower capital Investment and
less labour than other cash erop farming (e.g. maize) and generally
more lucrative. (60) Some of them had vast acreages of rice (and other
cash crops) elsewhere in the Upper Region and Northern Region bene-
fiting from the easy and cheap access to land in the North and leaving
actual farm management to appointed farm managers (often relatives).
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They were heavily dependent on the state for subsidized inputs and
machinery and on bank loans.
Irrigated ricefields in the Vea Irrigation Project differed from
rainfed ricefields elsewhere in the Upper Region (in particular in the
Fumbisi Valley) in two aspects: First, they were much smaller, varying
from around 8 to 20 acres compared with the 50 - 500 (and even more)
acres in the Fumbisi Valley. This was not only due to the 30 acre limit
land allocation policy of the Vea Land Allocation Committee but also to
the higher labour requirements demanded by irrigated rice-farming. Se-
condly, closely connected with prevlous point, farming in the irrigated
Vea ricefields was much less capital-intensive than in the Fumbisi
Valley.
Though some initial investments had to be made in the preparation
of the ricefields (as most of the project area was still undeveloped
or semi-developed in the beginning of the seventies), commercial farmers
were able to make nice profits as the high number of labour required was
extremely cheap, rent and maintenance charges by the project management
very low (0 3 per acre a year) and the ricefields could be cropped twice
a year. Akanpatulsi has computed that any person who was cultivating
2 acres of rice at Vea in 1973 could count on a net income of between
V 632.00 to £ 824.00. (61) These figures are far better than the income
of a local peasant on a 2 acre plot whose income at that time was around
£ 200.00 and that of an industrial worker whose yearly wage was around
(2 400.00. Moreover, Akanpatulsi's computation took place at a time when
commercial farmers were still given seeds and inputs by the project
management on condition that they sold their produce to the rice-mills
where they only fetched {2 10 a bag of rice (though some of them had al-
ready invented means to seil part of their produce in the market where
they fetched JZ 45 a bag or smuggled it to near-by Upper Volta). A few
years later (1975) when food prices started to rise dramatically in
Ghana, commercial farmers were officially allowed to seil their produce
in the market; but even then most of the produce was smuggled to Upper
Volta as black market rates permitted commercial farmers to make huge
profits. This means that the state was subsidizing some of the costs
of commercial farmers (like inputs and seeds) but that the increased rice
production was not benefiting Ghana and not reflected in prices pald by
the consumers. Moreover, profits made were mostly not re-invested in
HUPl
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Table 3. Breakdown of Land Allocation at Vea Project during the 1978-79
Irrigation Season
INSTITUTION HA ACRES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Ghana Industrial 230 575
Holding Corpora-
tion (GIHOC)
Irrigation Deve- 10 25
lopment Authority
(IDA)
Food Product ion
Corporation (FPC) 4 10
Ghana National Re- 38 95
construction Corps
(GNRC) and Upper
Regional Develop-
ment Corporation
(URDECO)
Commercial farmers 36.4 91
REMARKS
GIHOC occupies the whole developed area
along the right bank of the main canals.
Some land is allocated to the Ghana Na-
tional Reconstruction Corps (GNRC) and
private farmers. GIHOC uses 202 displace<
peasants as outgrowers. Only 75 acres
were cropped during the 1978/79 season.
Only 2 ha have been developed and in use
Only 1.2 ha in use.
GNRC cropped 15 acres employing 66
"settlers". URDECO cropped only 4 ha,
employing 39 workers.
Only 8 commercial farmers, mainly ab-
6. Settler farmers
7. Gowrie Continua-
tion School
8. Squatters
sentee farmers, were left in 1978. They
had only 16 ha in use.
7.1 19 22 peasant farmers allowed to farm by
the Land Allocation Coramittee, mostly
from Gowrie. All land is cropped ef-
ficiently.
1.2 3 All cropped efficiently.
44.8 112 There are 400 illegal farmers or squat-
ters who are occupying semi-developed
or undeveloped lands. These squatters
have between 1/8 to 1/4 of an acre each
covering an estimated 44.8 ha, all
cropped.
Source: Memorandum on Land Allocation Tono and Vea Irrigation Projects
by Ag. Gen. Manager (A.A. Kaleem) to the Ag. Chief Executive IDA,
12th April 1979; and Situational Report on Vea Irrigation Project
Interim Land Allocation Committee, in file UCR 03/11A.
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agriculture in the area of exploitation but in business or houses and/or
siphoned off to the South.
The allocation of lands to commercial farmers and state corporations
along the left bank of the main canals created a landless peasantry
(except a very small plot around the compound). Peasants were enraged
about the transfer of their lands to strangers, and, even worse,
Southerners, but should one of them dare confront one of the commercial
farmers, hè was told that the lands were "government lands" now, given
to the commercial farmers, or that the commercial farmers were working
for the government. As quite a number of the commercial farmers were
civil servants (like agricultural and irrigation officers), peasants
did not, at least initially, question the answer. Moreover, peasants
were quite aware that commercial farmers were powerful and influential
people in society with close links to the state apparatus and its in-
struments of force (some commercial farmers were police and army officers)
Peasants who tried to occupy a portion of the land left fallow by the
commercial farmers were forcibly evicted, threatened should they return,
or even arrested. Peasants who decided not to migrate were left with the
choice either to carve out an existence within the pre-capitalist sector,
seil their labour power to the capitalist sector, or both.
Most household heads resented or refused to work for their ex-
propriators, the commercial farmera, for low wages eroded by increasing
Inflation. They wanted to keep themselves to their traditional task of
providing the family with food from the farm; and though the small com-
pound farm could not supply more than a few months' food, any production
of Staples was of vital importance in a time when food prices in Ghana
skyrocketed. They tried to combine food production with increased eraft
production and/or wage-labour (there was considerable competition for
the job of watchman) with Taylor Woodrow, the Irrigation Development
Authority (IDA) and the state corporations in the project area, which
in contrast to the commercial farmers, paid at least the minimum wage.
Thoae household heads who did not master a craft or could not secure
wage-labour were worse off and sometimes forced to work for the commercial
farmers.
Young men trying to escape from the control of the household heads
and to secure an own income were often forced to work for the commercial
farmers in the absence of more lucrative job openings. They, however,
preferred to work in groups on contract basis for specific jobs which
could not be easily done by women and children and/or which were tra-
l
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ditionally done by men like soll preparation and weeding (though commercial
farming blurred the traditional division of labour between men and women).
Contract work enabled them at least some bargaining power vis-a-vis the
employer in particular with regards to the most dlfficult jobs like land
development.
Women and children (many under 15 years of age, by whose employment
commercial farmers contravened the existing labour laws in Ghana) (62)
forraed the major labor supply to commercial farmers. Their labour power
was no longer badly needed on the small compound farm and work in the
commercial farmers' ricefields was almost the only wage-labour available
to women and children in the project area, as the state corporations and
the contractor, Taylor Woodrow, excluded women and children from recruit-
ment. Wage-labour gave women a certain independence from their husbands
since they lost their own farmland in the project area. Commercial farmers
in general preferred women and children to men except for the most tedious
jobs as they were traditionally more experienced in certain farm operations
like sowing and harvesting, more easily controlled and cheaper. Wages were
always about half the minimum wage and for children even less for a
much longer working day than in the state corporations. However,
though wages were abysmally low, they formed a welcome addition to
the meagre family income.
While workers in the state corporations are organised by the
Ghana TUC, providing them at least with some protection, workers with
the commercial farmers are not. Labour relations in commercial farmers'
ricefields demonstrated all the characteristics of what Cox has called
the "primitive markef'-system. (63) Labour relations varied from
paternalism under the most favourable conditions to what resembles
master-slave relations under the worst conditions. Some commercial
farmers constantly bullied their workers; it even happened that they
refused to pay or paid only part of the wages, especially to children,
under the pretext that they did not finish a job in time or did not
perform a job to the employer's satisfaction. Workers had no other
choice than to accept this treatment or to look for a "good master".
An open confrontation with the employer was simply too risky. Not only
would a "troublemaker" be summarily dismissed bu~ would also lose any
Chance to be employed by another commercial fa^~<3r. Moreover, some
commercial farmers did not hesitate to call i policemen and s
to deal with such "enemies of the agricultural revolution". Workers^
\
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however, devised various informal means to protest individually or
in groups against a "bad master": slow-downs, sabotage, stealing or
burning the rice, blocking the Irrigation canals, chasing their animals
into the ricefields etc.
The majority of the commercial farmers, however, tried to play the
role of "good master". They were well aware that the harsh treatment
of workers would be counterproductive (slow-downs/sabotage) or even a
threat to their ricefields (burning the ricefields). They tried to
establish friendly relations with their workers, pay them the füll wage
regularly, provide them with food during working hours, supply them with
some rice after harvest or allow them to piek the rice which was left
in the fields after harvest, and send them to hospital or to the market
in town by tractor.
A change in the land allocation policy forced the commercial farmers
and state corporations to vacate their lands after the last harvest in
1979. Most of them, however, had already left the area by then. Some
of them had to stop farming when Taylor Woodrow moved into the project
and its construction and development works affected their lands.
Others fled from the area during the "4th June (Rawlings) Revolution"
fearing that peasant-workers would call in soldiers to punish their
oppressors and exploiters. (64) Their ejection from the area may be
only temporary as they were promised by the reconsituted Vea Land
Allocation Committee that they were "to be reconsidered after top
priority had been given to displaced farmers and institutions whose
activities are meant to improve agriculture as a whole". (65)
Along the right bank of the main canals (near the villages Vea,
Sumbrungu, Yikine, Nyarega and Zaare) land was mainly allocated to
G1HOC which wanted to secure a regulär and cheap supply of tomatoes
for its tomato processing factory at Pwalugu. (66) Because of the
slow pace of the construction and development works only 105 acres
had been somewhat developed along the right bank by 1975/76 and GIHOC
cultivated all this acreage, the largest acreage ever cultivated to
tomatoes in Ghana. In the 1976/77 season 220 acreas were made available
by the Irrigation Division to GIHOC; and GIHOC started an outgrowers'
scheme in co-operation with the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB).(67)
Displaced peasants from the nearby villages were grouped on volun-
tary basis during the dry season to produce tomatoes for GIHOC under
GIHOC supervision; in the wet season part of the GIHOC land was distri-
buted among individual outgrowers on which they were allowed to grow
*
Jb.
-27-
their own crops. Though peasants resented GIHOC's occupation of their
lands, quite a number of them were initially interested in the outgrowers'
scheine, äs it enabled them to obtain some income from the outgrowers'
scheine in the dry season and an extra plot -though very small- to culti-
vate their Staples in the wet season. Selection of the limited number of
peasants required for the scheine was left to the chiefs. This procedure
enabled chiefs to reward their followers and favourites with registra-
tion for the scheine and exclude their opponents. GIHOC management de-
pended also to a large extent on the chiefs for peasant control during
tomato production. The selected peasants were supplied by GIHOC with
fertilizer and seedlings and tractor services and a monthly allowance
of $ 20 (in 1978 raised to & 30) during the production period of tomatoes
on credit to be deducted at source after harvest. Outgrowers were forced
to seil all their tomato produce to GIHOC after harvest at a price dic-
tated by GIHOC which was far below the market price.
Various authors have pointed out that the structural position of
those outgrowers in the process of production and exchange resembles
that of a Proletariat referring to them äs "semi-proletarians" (68),
"disguised" proletarians (69) or "wage-labour equivalents". (70) GIHOC
outgrowers are dispossessed of their lands (though GIHOC allows them to
farm on its land during the wet season), their production is subordina-
ted to and controlled by and their surplus value is appropriated by in-
dustrial (state-) capital by control of the exchange relations through
which the value of the product is realized. I consider GIHOC's out-
growers1 scheme as one concrete form of the proletarianisation process
that may present itself in various forms and in various degrees largely
according to the needs of and benefits to capital in a specific period
of time. (71) The outgrowers' scheme enables GIHOC:
- to control and exploit the producers' labour power during the pro-
duction period in order to ensure a regulär supply of cheap commodities
to its processing plant whilst shifting part of the production costs and
risks (inputs and agricultural services are only supplied on credit to
be deducted at source after harvest even if production fai Is) to the
producers;
- to escape from the bürden of füll proletarianisation, e.g., payment
of social security during the working season and wages during the off-
season.
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The outgrowers' scheme is preferred by GIHOC to füll proletarianisa-
tion not only because it is a cheaper and less risky form of production,
but also more easily accepted by peasants as it does not involve a sharp
and complete break with peasant production (outgrowers regain control
over their own production and exchange during the off-season). However,
the consequence of the latter (and a disadvantage of the scheme for
GIHOC) may be that control over outgrowers, standing midway between
peasants and proletarians, will be more problematical than over (füll)
proletarians.
The scheme, indeed, did not prove to be very successful. GIHOC
management faced, besides problems of lack of supervisory personnel and
machinery and erratic water supply which made the scheme already a hap-
hazard undertaking, constant difficulties in keeping control over out-
growers in the process of production and imposing its terms of exchange
on them. Some of those difficulties were already manifest during the
experimental trials after the construction of the dam:
- Outgrowers did not keep (strictly) to the rules and regulations set
by management. This practice was still promoted by the lack of super-
visory personnel and extension officers. Many outgrowers, for example,
were regularly absent to attend funerals or market days even though
tomato production under Irrigation conditions requires regulär and me-
ticulous care.
- Outgrowers resented working in a group. Those who worked hard and
were never absent were paid the same amount as those who were lazy
and frequently absent. (72) GIHOC's refusal to make changes in the
Organisation of production gave rise to an overall decrease in pro-
ductivity.
- Outgrowers did not trust GIHOC officers. Some managers underrecorded
the outgrowers' produce, eg., if an outgrower presented 20 crates of
tomatoes to GIHOC only 15 crates were recorded against his name. Other
managers tried to cheat outgrowers during payment as no receipts were
issued. Outgrowers1 discovery of those practices gave rise to with-
drawal frora the scheme, refusal to work under certain supervisors and
sometimes physlcal confrontation.
- Outgrowers remained reluctant to seil tomatoes to GIHOC at the price
dictated by GIHOC. Outgrowers received £ 15 a crate from GIHOC, while
a crate of tomatoes fetched 0 45 in the market. Outgrowers tried to
find ways to seil part of the produce in the market in order to realize
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a higher return to labour, though those found selling tomatoes in the
market would be brought to court by GIHOC or reported to the Regional
Administration. GIHOC, however, was sometimes forced to allow outgro-
wers to seil part of the perishable produce in the market as it faced
storage and transport difficulties. For example, in 1979 GIHOC manage-
ment allowed 54 outgrowers from Zaare to seil part of the produce in
the market and those outgrowers made together a nice profit of about
£ 50,000.00. This event well known in the whole area made outgrowers
even more reluctant to seil to GIHOC at its dictated price.
Faced with the problems of technical and social control of the
scheme described above, GIHOC was not able to cultivate more than 75
acres out of the 575 allocated to it by the Irrigation Development
Authority (IDA) during the 1978/79 season. Though GIHOC used the allo-
cated land as inefficiently as the other state corporations and commer-
cial farmers, cropping only a very small portion of the allocated land
(see table 3), GIHOC was not, like the other state corporations and
commercial farmers, forced by IDA to leave the project area when a
reconstituted Land Allocation Committee started to re-allocate lands to
displaced peasants. GIHOC was granted this special favour as the project's
primary aim had always been (and continued to be) to feed GIHOC's tomato
processing factory at Pwalugu.
In a memorandum to the Regional Commissioner GIHOC sought to ac-
quire in 1979 an 1800-acre farm in the project area, which would enable
GIHOC to produce 60% of the requirements of the Pwalugu factory from
its own farm while the remaining 40% would be purchased from outgrowers.
(73) The main arguments advanced by GIHOC to acquire such a large acrea-
ge farm in the Vea project area were: (1) the difficulties of peasant
control faced in the outgrowers' scheme; and (2) the acquisition of
new machinery and personnel to run such a large irrigated farm. (74)
While the reconstituted Vea Land Allocation Committee wanted to
consider GIHOC for land allocation in the project area, it was not pre-
pared to allocate the huge acreage demanded by GIHOC as its policy was
now to re-allocate lands to the displaced peasants first. Finally it was
agreed that GIHOC would be granted a 150-acre farm mainly for the pur-
pose of cultivating tomato seedlings; the production of tomatoes would
be left to peasants along the right bank of the main canals on their
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allocated plots during the dry season. An arrangement was made between
IDA and GIHOC that IDA would supervise those peasants grouped together
during the dry season for tomato production whilst GIHOC would supply
peasants with inputs, tractor services and a monthly allowance on credit
to be deducted at source after harvest. Allocated plots would be given
back to peasants in the wet season for individual cash erop production
under IDA supervision. While IDA and GIHOC proclaimed that peasants
were free to joln tomato-group-farming during the dry season, peasants
were regularly threatened with eviction from their allocated plots in
the project area if they did not join tomato-group-farming and did not
keep to the rules and regulations of irrigated tomato production set by
IDA. To overcome peasants' continuing resistance against group-farming,
it was now decided that IDA supervisors would keep records of those
peasants present or absent every day. Payment after harvest would now
be done by the chiefs; and the chiefs were empowered to determine on
the basis of the work records what to pay to each peasant. This arran-
gement which served to boost the chiefs controlling function over pea-
sants in the scheme may lead to an even greater abuse of power by chiefs
(e.g. chiefs underpaying opponents).
This new scheme not only relieves GIHOC of the trouble of control-
ling peasants, it also tends to increase the new supervisor's control
over the peasantry (and thus GIHOC's supply of tomatoes): The final
leasing of lands to the peasantry does not give rise to increased pea-
sant control over nis own production but to increased management con-
trol over the peasantry's production: as the peasant does not own the
land, hè can be evicted from it at any time should hè disobey the
rules and regulations set by management. Local peasants, not displa-
ced by the project and as such not (yet) entitled to land in the pro-
ject area after the re-allocation of lands, serve as a kind of "agra-
rian reserve army" useful for maintaining discipline and control over
those who participate in the project. (75)
5.2. Producers of Cash Crops Regulated and Controlled by IDA
\
The second military regime in Ghana, the NRC/SMC (1972-79), which
had been vigorously persuing the establishment of Ghanaian capitalism
in agriculture, often in partnership with foreign capital, in order to
reach the targets of its programmes, Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) and
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Operation Feed Your Industries (OFI), had increasingly become dissatis-
fied with this development strategy and more aware of the social and po-
litical imbalances it created by 1977. (76) The state's previous support
for commercial farming was rapidly waning as high state Investment in
this capitalist "venture" had not resulted in the expected self-suffi-
ciency in the production of food and agricultural raw materials. The
state turned again to "innovated" peasant production ass^the most via-
ble strategy to increase agricultural production. This remarkable change
in the state's agricultural policies was not only set into motion by the
state's dissatisfaction with the performance of large-scale farming but
also by the state's increasing dependence on the World Bank for financing
its development projects and its consequent acceptance of the World
Bank's "new" philosophy (of increasing the living Standards of the
poorest) in order to acquire the bank's loans. (77) The year 1977
witnessed the establishment of the Upper Region',1 Agricultural Deve-
lopment Programme (URADEP), an agricultural project covering the whole
Upper Region with large World Bank aid whose main objective was "to
improve the living conditions of small farmers' families by increasing
agricultural production and to establish permanent farmers' support
services". (78)
Moreover, the military regime met growing Opposition against local
peasants' eviction from their traditional lands in the Vea project area
and the allocation of those lands to mainly Southern petty-bourgois
elements, demonstrated by the number of petitions presented by indivi-
dual peasants, local chiefs, literates and students in the project vil-
lages and the Frafra Traditional Area, and Frafra influential in govern-
ment circles. (79) This appeal to the SMC to revise the land allocation
policy in the Vea Project area took place in a time that the ownership
of Northern lands was a matter of national debate and a very sensible
issue in the North. (80) The SMC, looking desperately for support in
the North in the most critical period of its existence, (81) wanted to
appease those dissatisfied elements in the North by re-allocating lands
to the original owners.
The final decision to re-allocate lands to local peasants was taken
after project management's complaints of inefficiënt land use by mostly
absentee commercial farmers and state corporations despite high state
Investment in the project. To this end management recommended that lands
in the project area should be blocked according to traditional village
lands boundaries. Commercial farmers and state corporations whose legal
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title to land was often difficult to establish (as there were all kinds
of "arrangements" between them and the Land Allocation Committee) should
be given a deadline for leaving the area and displaced peasants whose
production would be "modernized" and supervised by project management,
should be given priority over any other prospective land user. (82).
Registration of displaced peasants by a reconstituted Vea Land Al-
location Committee started on 24th October 1977. The help of chiefs and
elders was sollicited in conducting the registration because no preli-
minary survey was ever held about the number of peasants displaced and
their acreage. Qualification for tenure were:
(1) Registration was limited to local (displaced) peasants who actually
farmed or intended to farm exclusively; absentee-farming amongst dis-
placed peasants and "wavering allegiance" to the project should be dis-
couraged. This regulation should guarantee a more optimal use of irriga-
ted land by and increased management control over participants in the pro-
ject than had been the case during the commercial farmers' period. As this
new regulation made it almost impossible for participants in the project
to engage in any other productive activity than cashcropping, it made them
(already deprived of land for food production) largely dependent on cash-
cropping for their sustenance and thus more subject to management control;
(2) The age limit was set at 18 years as young men were customarily not
supposed to have an own land but to work on the family head's farm;
(3) Women were not considered since, according to the Land Allocation Com-
mittee (but not entirely correct as we have seen), customarily they work
on their husbands' farms; an exception was later made for widows.
Considering the large number of peasants who qualified for land allo-
cation, the head of each household was to be selected to hold in trust the
land to be allocated for all individuals under his jurisdiction. This re-
gulation had the advantage of making the household head, the traditional
controller of family lands and family labour, a co-partner in management's
control over the project's lands and labour supply. It was suggested that
each landowner should be accorded some legal title to the land for a spe-
cific period which had to be reviewed every year in order to control pea-
sants' production; a person's title to land was to be revoked if hè was
found "unproductive or delinquent". Initially it was accepted that each
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peasant should be allocated 0.20 ha (£ acre) of land, considered the
maximum of land a peasant could handle under Irrigation conditions. Pro-
viding each peasant with the same amount of high yielding irrigated land
to be cultivated with "modern" production techniques tends, according to
Cowen, to avoid the uncontrollable aspects of rieh peasant differentation
and to create a stable middle peasantry, better off than non-participants
in the project, and therefore more easily controlled by project management.
(83) Later it was discovered that the theoretical fraction of è acre would
not work considering the large number of peasants qualifying for a plot
and the size of the plot had to be determined by the number of prospec-
tive peasants in each village. The very small plots which were finally
to be allocated makes one already doubt that the creation of a middle pea-
santry, better off than non-participants in the project, could ever be
achieved.
If the number of peasants in a household W2S small, they should be
grouped into units with other households as "this System of grouping would
ensure that holdings are not unduly divided to impede use of mechanical
appliances. It also has the advantage, among other things, of ensuring
close supervision". After displaced peasants had been satisfied, the re-
maining land should be allocated to indigenous, not displaced peasants and
to commercial, non-absentee farmers, who could not only serve as "shining
examples of modern farming" to peasants but also render agricultural ser-
vices (like tractor services) and as such lighten management's bürden. (84)
The latter should be allocated plots not exceeding 30 acres. The re-intro-
duction of commercial farmers will certainly re-create the old Problems of
management control over commercial farmers' production and exchange and
the re-emergence of the uncontrollable aspects of rieh peasant differentia-
tion, undermining the policy of creating a stable, undifferentiated middle
peasantry.
The registration and the actual land allocation were surrounded by
many "illegal" actions, gave rise to increased differentiation among pea-
ants and brought many conflicts into the open:
- As there were no records about previous landowners and their holdings, the
reconstituted Land Allocation Committee had to rely on the chiefs for the
Identification of peasants entitled to land. Some of the chiefs entered fic-
titious names in the register and names of persons not entitled to land in
the project area, often richer peasants and petty-bourgeois elements from
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Bolgatanga, to gain favour from such persons and to have access to a rela-
tively large tract of irrigated land. Some peasants, dissatisfied with the
small plot to be allocated to them (often less than è acre) followed the
chiefs' example. Especially able to do this were the chiefs' favourites, who
did it with the chiefs' connivance. This practice enabled those peasants to
hold land in trust for their relatives in the South who did not yet intend
to return to the project area and as such were excluded from land allocation.
Even if they were unable to cultivate all the land acquired, they
could sublet land to less fortunate clansmen and friends. Peasants who
registered the correct number of household members entitled to land suf-
fered because this "illegal" practice reduced the land allocated to
them. The resulting differentation tended to create tensions and conflicts
among peasants undermining even further the establishment of a stable
middle peasantry and lowering management control over the peasantry.
Chiefs and elders in some villages (often pushed by the not-dis-
placed peasants in the village) refused to give priority to displaced
peasants during the allocation exercise and wanted to grant all peasants
in the village an "equal" chance to land allocation in the project area
as "everybody" had suffered as a result of the construction and develop-
ment works: relatives had provided displaced peasants with a small plot
to settle. While indeed some peasants in the village had given a small
portion of land to their displaced "brothers", this does not hold true
for all of them. Moreover, the sufferings of even those peasants who had
to give lands to their displaced "brothers" cannot be compared with
those of peasants who lost all their lands (and some even their houses)
in the project area. While local peasants normally accept and respect
every decision taken by the chief, and displaced peasants in some vil-
lages accepted even this decision, others were not willing to do so.
After all their sufferings they were not prepared to sacrifice on behalf
of those peasants who had not lost any (or hardly any) land. They became
even more determined not to give in when they heard what happened in
those villages where displaced peasants had accepted the chiefs deci-
sion: more land was often allocated to those peasants who were not
displaced than to the displaced ones; and in some cases displaced pea-
sants did not even acquire any land as the developed land to be allo-
cated got finished, thus further increasing differentiation among peasants.
They had meetings convened in which the question was hotly discussed
between displaced peasants on one side and the chiefs and not-displaced
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peasants on the other. Displaced peasants were able to achieve first or
exclusive consideration during the land allocation exercise.
- The land allocation exercise brought into open conflicts between pea-
sants and the Land Allocation Committee. Some developed land was not
allocated to peasants and they alleged that this lands was "reserved"
by the Land Allocation Committee for project managers and extension of-
ficers. Most peasants complained that the allocated land was too small
or less fertile in comparison with their previous plot(s) in the pro-
ject area. They were, however, told that the lands were "government
lands" and that the Land Allocation Committee was authorized to handle
the allocation exercise. Peasants should accept the plot allocated to
them or leave it. Most peasants not knowing how to channel their grie-
vances, did not pursue the matter; only a few literates dared to con-
front the Land Allocation Committee and managed to get more land.
- The registration and land allocation exercise brought about a con-
flict between the tindana and the chief and Land Allocation Committee.
The post-colonial state tends, just like the colonial state, to over-
look the tindana and his authority and to promote the power of the
chiefs. (85) During the registration and land allocation exercise the
tindana was neither consulted with regards to land matters nor asked
to perform the necessary rites. Everything was arranged between the Land
Allocation Committee and the chiefs (who make use of their newly acqui-
red power with regard to land matters to enrich themselves and to esta-
blish a network of clients). Peasants resent the infringement of tradi-
tion and the present Subordination of the tindana to the chief in land
matters and they fear calamities as the earth gods were never pacified
during the land allocation exercise. The Nyarega tindana showed his pro-
test by refusing to accept any compensation for the loss of his house
and to register for land allocation as "the lands belong to me and I
was never consulted during the allocation exercise".
- The registration and land allocation exercise brought about conflicts
about the traditional village land boundaries. A conflict between Yiki-
ne and Sumbrungu peasants about the land boundaries in the project area
forced the Land Allocation Committee to stop land allocation. Lands
which were among the most fertile in the project site lay fallow for
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some time till the Yikine chief finally consented to allow Sumbrungu
peasants to farm in the disputed area (without dropping his claim on the
disputed lands).
After the allocation of lands peasants hold the irrigated lands on
lease (and a nominal rent for the land and a nominal fee for the supply
of irrigation water will have to be paid to IDA) which expires immedia-
tely upon peasants' disobedience to the rules and regulations of pro-
duction and exchange set by IDA.
IDA teils peasants what to grow. Peasants have to grow cash crops
(mainly rice and toraatoes, but also maize, groundnuts and sorghum). Pea-
sants do not even have a voice in what cash crops to grow. For example,
peasants were forced to grow tomatoes for GIHOC even though some of them
would have liked to grow groundnuts and maize (cash crops which can be
consumed in time of need). Peasants are struggling to make management
revise its policy of growing cash crops exclus^vely in the project area
(and will surely devise means to obstruct production if not allowed).
As Wolf has demonstrated peasants favour commodity production only with-
in the context of an assured production of use-values (86) and the Gon-
ja Development Corporation scheme is a clear proof of Wolfs thesis.
There is always some increment of risk in shifting from the production
of use-values to commodities. Quite apart from the frequently higher
cost of producing cash crops, a bumper harvest does not, by itself,
assure a family's food supply. (87)
IDA teils peasants how to grow. Not only the choice of products
are determined from above but also the cultivation techniques, thus in-
flicting upon the peasants higher production costs. Peasants are supplied
with inputs and tractor services by IDA (and GIHOC during the dry season
tomato production) the costs of which have to be repaid immediately af-
ter harvesting. Peasants resent their lands being prepared by IDA since
the Operation is expensive and subject to delays. IDA lacks machlnery
and competent personnel for tractor services and its supply of inputs
is often irregulär and not at the correct time. Last year peasants wai-
ted for tractor services and inputs supply till it was almost too late
and finally decided to plough themselves (sometimes with their own bul-
lock ploughs) and use their own seeds. Tractors which finally appeared
ploughed so inexpertly that the water could not flow through the rid-
ges, resulting in low yields. Peasants want to continue ploughing the
lands themselves using their own bullocks. The supply of tractor ser-
vices and inputs, though subsidized, is quite costly for most peasants
l
l
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It may be that the re-allocation of lands to peasants combined
with the control and regulation of their production and exchange is
more likely to achieve the aim of the project than the previous (füll)
proletarianisation and outgrowers' scheme: a regulär and cheap supply
of cash crops to the national (or, more acurately, Southern) and pos-
sibly international market. However, this section shows that the con-
flict between management and the peasantry about the peasants' loss of
control over the means of production, production process and terms of
exchange has not disappeared dispite increased management control. The
question may be posed: is there any chance that this conflict will move
peasants into (collective) action to regain control over the means of
production, production and exchange?
6. DOMESTIC COMMUNITY: CONTROL OR ACTION?
Peasants in the Vea Irrigation Project have been subjected to ex-
propriation of their lands which deprived them to a large extent of
their food production (and grazing land) and forced them to become
cashcroppers in various ways for the national and international market.
Even after the re-allocation of lands peasants do not consider the
allocated lands as their own (and project management emphasizes con-
stantly that the lands are "government lands") because they entirely
lack any control over the means of production, and the processes of
production and exchange. Peasants were deeply aggrieved by the loss of
(control over) their lands and the exploitation of their labour power by
state and commercial farmers. Various formidable obstacles, some of
which have been mentioned as general obstacles to peasant Organisation
and action (88) while others are more peculiar to the region and the
project, would have to be overcome by peasants in order to translate
their feelings of grievance and exploitation into Organisation and
(collective) action:
- The power of the state with its legal and coercive apparatus. Though
local peasants were not aware of it, the state had acquired a legal
title to land in the colonial period. The state could claim any land
in the North for development purposes and lease it to any Ghanaian.
Legal title to land could always be backed by force. State control over
land in the North is a serious obstacle to what Wolf has called the
"tactical power" of the peasant. (89) "Government land" used to be com-
m
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mercial farmers' warning to any peasant willing to occupy the land;
"government land" is management's most important weapon of peasant
control and action after the re-allocation of lands.
- The chiefs' "middleman" function between the dornestic community and
the state and capitalist System. The colonial state wanted to use the
existing and newly created chiefs in the North for control of the do-
mestic community and supply of its labour power. The development of
indirect rule not only installed the chief as a junior partner in the
colonial administration but was also a cheap way to reproduce the la-
bour power. The post-colonial state maintains the chiefs' "colonial"
role: it was only the chiefs' consent (not the peasants') which was
"asked" for the construction of the project; it was their task to
inform the people and secure (and maintain) their support. The chiefs'
"permission" was obtained before commercial farmers and state corpo-
rations could enter the project area; it was their task to guarantee
peace and supply workers. After changes in the land allocation poli-
cies the chief kept his "middleman" function as supplier of the do-
mestic community's labour power (registration and land allocation ex-
ercise) and controller of this labour power (GIHOC and IDA schemes).
The post-colonial state uses the same means of rewarding the "loyal"
chiefs for their services: the chiefs authority is pushed at the ex-
pense of the tindana and ample room is left for the chiefs to exploit
their people and enrich themselves (some chiefs were farming along-
side the commercial farmers; others acquired vast tracts of land in
the project area while they had none before, etc.)
The "middleman" role of the chief based on his "traditional" lea-
dership function within the domestic community is well Consolidated
by the state. The chief is the leader of the people whose authority
is highly respected and whose directives are harldy ever challenged.
He who takes any action without the chief's knowledge let alone against
the chief takes great risks; a whole scala of "traditional" sanctions
are at the chiefs disposal. The chiefs leadership of the domestic
community is acknowledged and reinforced by the state. No peasant can
approach the state apparatus without the consent or even the presen-
ce of the chief (e.g. to lodge a complaint). Peasants are completely
dependent on the chief for the representation of their interests to
the state. Moreover, if the chiefs "middleman" function is challen-
ged, hè may count on state sanctions against his challengers.
Consldering the chiefs1 "middleman" function it is not surpri-
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sing that those "traditional" leaders have not played any remarkable
leadership role on behalf of their subjects. The pressures from above
on those "junior partners" are simply too big to overcome; to oppose
the state is as risky for them as for their subjects. Moreover, they
themselves are divided by all kinds of petty conflicts (90); and last
but not least they have benefited in one way or the other from the
project. Still their role is not completely negative. Their peculiar
role as "middlemen" does not allow them to overlook completely their
subjects' interests in particular with regards to a project that deep-
ly affected people's lives and livelihood (even some chiefs lost their
lands in the project area). Most chiefs have written petitions calling
the state's attention to their people's misery and humbly requesting
the retrieval of their lands.
l
l
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- Internal differentiation and divisions already existing before the
construction of the project but enlarged and enhanced by the project:
(1) First of all, one can distinguish between those who were comple-
tely dependent on the land and those who derived part of their
income from trade, eraft production or wage-labour. As the latter
were less dependent on the land, the project did not threaten their
existence as much. Moreover, while a small number of those who we-
re completely dependent on the land resigned to the "fate" of lo-
sing their lands (hardened by a long history of suffering and hun-
ger), most of them either withdrew from the project (migration) or
adapted to the new Situation by taking up craft production or wage-
labour.
(2) Secondly, there was the division between those who were evicted
from the land immediately after the construction of the dam (espe-
cially those close to the dam) and those who squatted on the land
in the project area till the construction and development works
reached their lands. The slow progress of the construction and de-
velopment works had the unintended consequence that quite a number
of peasants could continue to farm on their lands for some time.
The project did not affect a large body of peasants at the same
time and to the same extent which could have moved them to collec-
tive action. (91)
(3) And finally there were those who got better off by the project and
those who got worse off. Some peasants who had no land or a small
plot in the project area managed to get a large plot during the
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registration and allocation exercise (chiefs in collusion with
richer peasants and petty-bourgeois elements) while others who pre-
viously had land in the project area received smaller plots or, in
some cases, none at all. Moreover, those peasants who are forced to
grow tomatoes by management (peasants along the right bank of the
main canals) have always been better off than those who are forced
to grow other cash crops. Bumper harvests of tomatoes (as GIHOC
was able to provide peasants with a regulär supply of inputs and
tractor services) combined with the permission to seil in the market
(as GIHOC lacked storage and transport facilities) enabled tomato-
growers to obtain a rauch better income than other cashcroppers in
the project area. This new differentiation tended to give rise to
internal conflicts among peasants and to prevent formation of a
common front against the exploiter.
(4) Lack of leadership. We have seen that the "+raditional" peasant lea-
ders, the chiefs, did not (or better could not) mobilize their sub-
jects. Various authors have referred to the difficulties encountered
by "outside" leaders in rallying peasants behind them and the (ini-
tial) mistrust they face from the side of peasants. (92) Schiphorst
shows how the Zaare Youth Movement, an Organisation of literates
(mainly teachers) in one of the villages in the project site, Zaare,
failed to mobilize peasants against the commercial farmers for main-
ly the aame reasons. (93) Being illiterate and not knowing how to
channel their grievances, peasants relied initially on the literates
in the villages for writing petitions and presenting their grievan-
ces and complaints to the Regional Administration, but as soon as it
became evident that the Regional Administrators did not pay attention
to them (and even did not want to receive them) peasants' reliance on
them stopped. The activities of a regional Organisation of literates,
the Frafra Youth Movement, did not go beyond presenting a petition for
the review of the allocation of lands to the Commissioner of Lands and
Mineral Resources in Accra. (94) At present, the General Agricultural
Workers Union (GAWU) of the Ghana TUC attempts, after years of neg-
lect, to organise workers and peasant-workers outside the state farms
and state corporations, but mainly lack of staff and finance prevents
it from making a big inroad.
(5) Dependence on cashcropping and individualised cashropping. The al-
most complete destruction of their food production (and grazing land)
made peasants to a large extent dependent on the production of cash
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crops in the project area. While peasants resent the control and ex-
ploitation of their labour power by commercial farmers and the state,
represented by the state corporations and IDA, any (open) collective
action threatens their livelihood, because a large agrarian reserve
army is waiting to replace them. Moreover, cashcropping under IDA
supervision (after the re-allocation of lands) individualises pea-
sants instead of socialising them. While peasants controlled and
regulated by IDA show many characteristics of a Proletariat, they
are not socially concentrated: production takes place on the basis
of individual households which makes collective action more difficult.
While those factors were important impediments to (formal) Organi-
sation and (collective) action, peasants, proletarianized in various
degrees and forms, have, just like the industrial Proletariat (95), shown
a capacity to protest informally against the loss of control over the
means of production, and the processes of production and exchange. Pea-
sants have devised various ways of protesting as individuals and as lar-
ger groups, such as: (96)
- illegal squatting on the lands till the construction and development
works reached their lands;
- entering fictitious names and names of persons not entitled to land
in the registration list in order to acquire more land;
- refusal to adopt new cultivation practices, evasion of (Irrigation)
regulations (e.g., consistent absence), lowering production, bearing
in mind that such measures introducé a consideratie amount of risk
in the already precarious peasant living conditions;
- evasion of/withdrawal from cashcropping and/or finding alternative
sources of income (labour migration and eraft production);
- various forms of protest against conditions of labour: commercial
farmers were regulärly confronted with stealing and burning of rice,
blocking of the irrigation canals, chasing animals into the rice-
fields, and "slow-downs";
- evasion of the terms of exchange imposed by the state by selling in
the market in order to realize a higher return to labour or consuming
cash crops which - though involving a change in dietary practices-
formed a welcome addition to the almost completely destroyed food
production.
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It may be expected that in a Situation of tight control by state
and management (the sanction of eviction from the land and the use of
force) peasants will continue to devise ways to protest informally a-
gainst their control and exploitation. Possibly their action may go
beyond these admittedly negative forms of protest and acquire a broa-
der base in the future. After the re-allocation of lands peasants face
a common Situation of control and exploitation. It may be that thls
common Situation will help peasants to overcome their internal dif-
ferentiation and divisions and direct their attention and action against
their common outside enemies: IDA management and the state. That the
possibility of such a broadly based action is not merely speculative
is shown by peasant action during the 1980 tomato season.
During the 1980 bumper harvest of tomatoes, tons of tomatoes were
allowed to rot daily, when, initially, GIHOC management of the tomato
processing plant at Pwalugu did not supply IDA with the promised sto-
rage and transport facilities and the plant faced many machinery break-
downs. Following this clear demonstration of GIHOC management's in-
competence, and already resenting forced tomato-group-farming for GIHOC,
peasants threatened to refuse to harvest or produce tomatoes unless they
were allowed to seil them in the market. Having made a nice profit after
being allowed by IDA to seil in the market, peasants refused to seil to
GIHOC at controlled price (at a later stage when the initial difficulties
faced by GIHOC were overcome) and simply abandoned the fields. (97) The
example may be an exceptional case (as IDA management faced circumstan-
ces beyond its control), but it demonstrates the possibility and the
forms of peasants' collective action.
7. CONCLUSION
The Vea Irrigation Project has brought about a shift rather in the
domestic community's way of incorporation into the national (or, more
accurately, Southern) and international market than in its function:
the supply of cheap labour. Peasants1 transformation from producers of
use-values and migrant labourers into local producers of cash crops ori-
ginated from the post-colonial state's interest in increased agricultu-
ral production for capital accumulation and food supplies in the South,
and ultimately for its own suvival; it was achleved by land expropria-
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tion by the state resulting in the almost complete destruction of the
domestic community's food production and grazing land for livestock and
cattle, forcing peasants into cash erop production.
The state's initial attempt to increase agricultural production in
the project area by expropriating peasants and replacing thera with "pro-
gressive" commercial farmers, heavily subsidized by the state and ex-
ploiting the cheap labour power of proletarianized local peasants,
proved to be a fallure. Not only did this scheme create serious social
and political imbalances, it was uncapable of state control. Instead of
increasing state capital and cheap food supplies to the South, it in-
creased commercial farmers' capital at the expense of the state.
It was only after this failure that the state turned to peasant
production, leasing the developed lands to local peasants and "moder-
nizing" their production both to increase the level of production and
the level of (relative) surplus value to be appropriated by shifting
part of the costs of (modernized) production to peasants and buying
their produce far below its value: colonial cheap labour policy in a
post-colonial disguise'. The previous GIHOC outgrowers' scheme had de-
monstrated that peasants were not prepared voluntarily to keep to the
rules and regulations of increased production and exchange while having
to seil their produce far below its value and at the same time bearing
increased production costs. Therefore, stricter control over production
and exchange had to be applied. Control over production and exhange had
to be acquired by means such as:
- the regulation that all participants in the project had to be full-
time cashcroppers. Whilst the expropriation of lands had resulted in the
almost complete destruction of peasants1 food production, this new
regulation made i t almost impossible for peasants to engage in any other
productive activity than cashcropping and made them largely dependent on
cashcropping for their subsistence. While this regulation had the dis-
advantage of overruling the domestic community's "colonial" function of
subsidizing the reproduction of labour (which would have enabled the
state to lower even further the exchange-value of commodities), it had
the advantage of increased control (and the state seemed prepared to pay
for it);
- Prevention of differentiation and the tensions and conflicts connected
with it by allocating the same amount of land to every displaced peasant
l
l
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in the project area. However, the attempt to create a stable middle pea-
santry with a higher living Standard than that of non-participants in the
project, and consequently more easily controlled, failed to a large ex-
tent, as not-displaced (and often richer) peasants managed to get land
and sometimes even more land than displaced peasants;
- Control became centralised in one agency, IDA, which made use of the
traditional Instruments of control and supply of labour, the household
heads and the chiefs. IDA has various sanctions at its disposal like
withdrawing the supply of inputs and agricultural services to peasants
(forced to produce cash crops in the project area) if they try to avoid
selling their produce to IDA and GIHOC; refusing to pay for days of ab-
sence from work; and forcing peasants to repay the loan for inputs and
agricultural services supplied if the erop gets spoilt through negli-
gence or absence. State ownership of land provided IDA with the most
severe sanction: eviction from the land in case of "delinquent" beha-
viour.
The virtually total control of IDA over the means of production,
production process and terms of exchange puts peasants in a structural
Position that closely resembles that of a Proletariat, though the form
of peasant production appears to be largely maintained (individual hou-
sehold production on an "own" land) tending even to enhance management
control.
The state's attraction to such development schemes as the Vea Ir-
rigation Project for the virtually total control they allow over the
process of production and exchange and their potential for capital ac-
cumulation and increased cheap food supplies to the South will certain-
ly lead to a further promotion of such capital-intensive schemes. Va-
rious medium-sized and large Irrigation schemes are already planned or
under construction in the Upper Region, like the Tono Irrigation Pro-
ject, the Tamne Basin Irrigation Project, and the Lower White Volta
Basin Irrigation Project. Although these schemes are attractive to the
state, the costs involved are high and no safe guarantee can be obtai-
ned for increased agricultural production.
The state's shortage of Investment funds and the general lack of
qualified manpower and required technology in Ghana may give rise to
an increasing financial and technical dependence on foreign capital
and foreign aid organisations (especially World Bank and FAO). Although
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state funds covered the construction of the Vea Irrigation Project, the
successful completion of the project depended to a large extent on Tay-
lor Woodrow's (costly) delivery of technical and management skills and
technology. Dependency will continue and may even grow after the pro-
ject 's completion: there are, for example, contracts with foreign com-
panies for the regulär supply of fertilizer, and the grant of a three-
year management contract to another British multinational, Täte and
Lyle, has been seriously considered. Even If the state is able to con-
trol Opposition to the growing dependence on foreign capital, are even the
direct costs (irrespective of repayment of foreign loans supplied) not
prohibitive to the state? The virtually total collapse of the economy
after 1976 has prevented the regulär supply of machinery, spare parts,
petrol, oil and lubricants, inputs, transport and storage facilities to
the Vea project. The project envisages the re-introduction of (non-
absentee) commercial farmers who have to lightrn the state's bürden of
Provision of agricultural machinery and services. However, the re-
introduction of commercial farmers will certainly give rise to the re-
appearance of old problems: state control over commercial farmers'
production and exchange and increased differentiation.
Apart from aurmounting the costs involved, the success of those
schemes will also largely depend on the tightness of state control over
the peasantry's production and exchange. IDA's attempt to establish a
stable, undifferentiated, easily controlled, middle peasantry in the Vea
project failed to a large extent. Differentiation araong the peasantry
has even increased based upon the kind of cash crops produced: tomato-
growers have been much better off than other cashcroppers so far. While
the existing differentiation may create internal divisions and conflicts
among peasants, their common position in the process of production and
exchange and their common Subordination to control and exploitation may
help them to overcome these divisions and unite them against their com-
mon ennemy: the state. Is management's security-net, if neccessary
backed by the state's coercive power, tight enough to "contain" the
existing conflict between the peasantry and the state about the loss of
control over the means of production, and the processes of production
and exchange? We have demonstrated that peasants have been able to
devise ways to protest against their control and exploitation despite
formidable obstacles to Organisation and action. While this protest had
mostly an individual (though sometimes based on informally organised
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groups) and negative character until the re-allocation of the lands,
the post-re-allocation circumstances of control and exploitation (which
all peasants in the project area have in common) open the way to collec-
tive struggle, already manifest during the 1980 tomato-growers' protest
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NOTES
10.
11.
12.
13.
GNA, Tamale, Adm. 1/457, The problems involved in the develop-
ment of a backward area and their application to the economie
development of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast (by
P. Helps M.A., Ass. DC, NT, Gold Coast); for a useful discus-
sion of colonial economie policies in Northern Ghana, see Shep-
herd, A., The Development of Capitalist Rice Farming in Northern
Ghana, Ph.D.- thesis, University of Cambridge, 1979.
For the position of the tindana in the Frafra Traditional Area,
see Portes, M., The Dynamics of Clanship among the Tallensi,
London, 1945.
For land ownership in the Frafra Traditional Area, see Report
by the Committee on Ownership of Lands and Position of Tenants
in the Northern and Upper Region, unp. report, 1978.
Hart, J.K., Migration and the Opportunity Structure: A Ghanaian
case-study, in Amin, S., (ed.), Modern Migrations in Western
Africa, Oxford, 1974, p. 322.
Mouton, P.C.R., Answers to Questionnaire by the Chief Commis-
sioner of Northern Territories: South Mamprusi, p. 7. NAG-A/ADM
56/1/375.
Hilton, T.E., Frafra Resettlement and the Population Problem
in Zuarungu, in Bulletin de l'IFAN, XXII, ser. B, nos. 3-4,
1960, pp. 426-32.
Lynn, C.W., Agriculture in North Mamprusi, Bulletin 34, Accra:
Department of Agriculture (mimeo).
Adu, S.V., Soils of Navrongo-Bawku Area, Upper Region, Ghana,
Kumasi: Soil Research Institute, Memoir no. 5, 1969. The 1970
Ghana Sample Census of Agriculture gives a median size of 3.2
acre for landholding in Bolgatanga, see Republic of Ghana, Re-
port on Ghana Sample Census of Agriculture 1970, Accra, March
1972, Vol. I, tables VII. 10 and 11.
See Hunter, J., Population Pressure in a part of the West Afri-
can Savanna: A Study of Nangodi, North East Ghana, in Annals
of the Association of American Geographers, LVII, 1967, p. 105:
"Seasonal hunger is faced with equanimity, and seasonal loss of
body weight accepted as part of the normal pattern of events".
For the effects of drought on this area in the seventies, see
Ofori-Sarpong, E., Impact of Drought in Ghana and Upper Volta
(1970-1977), Climatological Research Paper no. l, Department
of Geography, University of Ghana, Legon, 1980.
Boserup, E., The Conditions of Agricultural Growth. The Econo-
mics of Agricultural Change under Population Pressure, Aldine,
1965.
For a review of the literature, see Bennett, A., and Schork, W.,
Studies toward a Sustainable Agriculture in Northern Ghana, Hei-
delberg, 1979. For the mixed cropping system among the Frafra,
see Aganah, S.A., The Vea (Yaratanga River) Irrigation Project:
An Appraisal of Farming Innovation, B.A. thesis, Department of
Geography, University of Ghana, Legon, 1972, pp. 4-7.
See Bening, R.B., Land Tenure System and Traditional Agriculture
of the Sissala, in Bulletin of Ghana Geograpical Association,
vol. 18, 1976, p. 20.
Hill, P., Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa, Cambridge
University Press, 1970. See also Plange, Nii-K., Underdevelop-
ment in Northern Ghana: Natural Causes or Colonial Capitalism,
in Review of African Political Economy, nos. 15-16, 1979, pp. 7-9.
-49-
14. Portes noted in 1945 among the Tallensi, a sub-grouping of the
Frafra "the almost complete absence of economie differentiation
by occupation or by ownership of ressources and, in particular,
the absence of both material and institutional possibilities for
capital accumulation or for technical advance". Portes, M., op.
cit., 1945, p. X; ibid., p. 240.
15. For the various types of voluntary and compulsory working groups
in the North, see Bennen, G., Types of Farm Labour in Northern
Ghana, unp. paper, Department of Geography, University of Ghana,
Legon, n.d.; and Bening, R.B., op. cit., 1976, pp. 23-24.
16. Portes, M., op.cit., 1945, p. 28; and Hart, J.K., op. cit., 1974.
17. Songsore, J., Structural Crisis, Dependent Capitalist Develop-
ment and Regional Inequalities in Ghana, ISS occasional paper,
no. 71, The Hague, July, 1979.
18. The Frafra worked, according to Hill, less in the cocoa farms than
in the mines. See Hill, P., The Occupations of Migrants in Ghana,
University of Michegan, occasional paper no. 42. For the transfor-
mation of the North into a reservoir of cheap labour, see for ex-
ample Plange, Nii-K., Opportunity Cost and Labour Migration,
in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1979, pp.
655-76; and for the Frafra area, Nabila, J.S., The Migration of
the Frafra of Northern Ghana. A Case Study of Cyclical Labour
Migration in West Africa, Ph.D. -thesis, Michegan University,
1974, pp. 67-72.
19. Thomas, R.G., Forced Labour in British West Africa: The Case of
the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, in Journal of African
History, XIV, l (1973), pp. 79-103.
20. For the attempt and failure to vest Southern lands in the state,
see Kimble, D., A Political History of Ghana, 1850-1928, Oxford,
1963, pp. 330-71.
21. This is exactly one of the most important differences with the pro-
posed but never accepted 1927 Land and Native Rights Ordinance which
stated that the whole of the land in the Protectorate, whether oc-
cupied or unoccupied at the commencement of the Ordinance, was
thereby declared public lands. See Agbosu, L.K., Statutory Founda-
tions of Land Administration in the Northern and Upper Regions in
Ghana, in Mensah-Brown, A.K., (ed.), Land Ownership and Registra-
tion in Ghana, UST, Kumasi: LARC, 1978, pp. 122-39. See also Der,
B.C., Colonial Land Policy in the Northern Territories in the Gold
Coast, in Universitas, vol. IV, no. 2, 1975; and West Africa,
22 May, 1978, pp. 978-79.
22. See Ladouceur, P.A., Chiefs and Politicians: The Politics of Regio-
nalism in Northern Ghana, London/New York, 1979, p. 123.
23. Portes, M., op. cit., 1945.
24. Ghana Population Census, 1960.
25. Shepherd, A., op. cit., 1979, pp. 35-36.
26. See Ladouceur, P.A., op. cit., 1979, p. 49.
27. Meillassoux, C., Femmes, greniers et capitaux, Paris, 1975.
28. Por the 1948 Christiansborg riots, see Austin, D., Politics in Ghana,
1946-1960, Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 77.
29. See Hilton, T.E., Land Planning and Resettlement in Northern Ghana,
in Geography, XLIV, 1959, pp. 227-40; and Nabila, J.S., op. cit.,
1974, pp. 76-79.
30. Chitsike, L.T., Aspects of Agricultural Development in North-East
Ghana, Ph.D. thesis, University of Ghana, 1975, p. 12.
-50-
31. Quansah, S.T., The Gonja Settlement and Development Scheme -Ghana,
in The Economie Bulletin of Ghana, ii, 1(1972).
32. The scheine aimed at, but never realized, 400 - 500 families. Hil-
ton estimated that roughly 60.000 people, 12.000 to 13.000 compound
families, had to be moved from the Frafra area to relieve the po-
pulation pressure. See Hilton, T.E., op. cit., 1959.
33. See Jeffries, R., Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana: The Railway-
men of Sekondi, Cambridge, 1978.
34. Beekman, B., The Agrarian Basis of the Post-Colonial State, Ghana:
1951-1978, in Nigerian Journal of Political Science, vol. I, no. l,
June, 1979, pp. 35-37.
35. Ghana, Seven Year Plan for National Reconstruction and Development.
Financial Years 1963/64 - 1969/70, Accra: GP, 1964, pp. 73-74. See
also Dadson, J.A., Socialised Agriculture in Ghana, 1962-1965, Ph.
D. thesis, Harvard University, 1970.
36. See Ladouceur, P.A., op. cit., 1979.
37. W.A. Amoro, MP for Bongo, in Ghana Parliamentary Debates, vol. 38,
p. 542.
38. See Arn, Jack, Political Economy of Urban Poverty in Ghana: The Case
of Nima, Accra, Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1978.
39. Bening, R.B., Development of Education in Northern Ghana, 1908-1957,
in Ghana Social Science Journal. vol. I, no.2, 1972.
40. For the terminology, see Post, K., Peasantisation and Rural Poli-
tical Movements in Western Africa, in Archives Européennes de Socio-
logie, III, 2 (1973), pp. 223-54; and Cohen, R., From Peasant to
Workers, in Gutkind, P.C.W., and Wallerstein, I., (eds.), The Politi-
cal Economy of Contemporary Africa, Beverly Hills/London, 1976, pp.
155-68.
41. See Gore, C.G., Food Marketing and Rural Underdevelopment: A study
of an Urban Supply System in Ghana, Ph.D. thesis, Pennsylvania
State University, 1978.
42. Shepherd, A., op. cit., 1979, p. 51.
43. Project costs were initially estimated at (Z 2.5. m., but doubled soon
to (Z 5 m., and reached £ 15 m. in 1979. For the history of the pro-
ject and its technical details, see Report of Vea Irrigation Project,
Irrigation Department, n.d.
44. Contract involved favourable foreign exchange terms, management
and design services, and delivery of machinery and spare parts. Tay-
lor Woodrow was first awarded a contract to construct the Tono Ir-
rigation Project near Navrongo in 1975. The Vea Irrigation Project
enabled Taylor Woodrow to penetrate further the Ghanaian economy.
It was soon awarded a huge building contract in Accra.
45. Interview with local manager Taylor Woodrow at Gowrie, 17 October,
1979.
46. Taylor Woodrow Main Office, Accra, sent many letters to the Ministry
on Finance and the Irrigation Development Authority to complain
about the many delays and setbacks. See for example Letter Taylor
Woodrow, Accra, to Ag. Chief Executive Irrigation Development Au-
thority, Accra, 9th April, 1979, ref. no. MDW/SA.
47. For one of such experiences in Zambia, see Colson, E., The Social
Consequences of Resettlement. Kariba Studies IV, Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 1971.
48. See Chambers, R., (ed.), The Volta Resettlement Experience, London,
1970; Lumsden, D.P., Nchumuru Social Organization and the Impact
of the Volta River Project, Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge,
1973; and Hart, D., The Volta River Project. A Case Study in Poli-
tics and Technology, Edinburgh University Press, 1980.
-51-
49. See the 1967 and 1968 Minutes of the Vea Resettlement Commit-
tee Meetings, in file FDC/12/SF. 5.
50. See Memorandum submitted by Upper Regional Agricultural Officer
on behalf of the Vea Resettlement Committee to the Commissioner
for Agriculture through the Principal Secretary, Ministry of
Agriculture, Bolgatanga, 19th July 1968, ref. no. UG/59/SF.73/219.
51. Petition Presented by the Frafra Youth Movement: For a Review of
the Allocation of the Vea Dam Farmland, Bolgatanga, 28th February,
1977.
52. Akuto Atanga, P., The Vea Irrigation Scheme, B.A. thesis, Depart-
ment of Geography, University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, August,
1979.
53. See note 51.
54. See Hutchfui, E., A Tale of Two Regimes: Imperialism, the Military
and Class in Ghana, in Review of African Political Economy, no. 14,
1979, pp. 36-56.
55. Two Year Development Plan. From Stabilization to Development, Accra,
July, 1968; and Budget Statement for 1970-71, Ministry of Finance
and Economie Planning, Accra, August, 1970, in particular pars.
43 and 67-68.
56. See Chitsike, L.T., op. cit., 1975, pp. 14-16; For USAID's "Focus
and Concentrate" programme, see Van Logchem, J.Th., The Focus and
and Concentrate Programme in the Bolgatanga District. Evaluation
of an Extension Programme, Cape Coast, 1972.
57. Aganah, S.A., op. cit., 1972, p. 39.
58. See Letter Chief of Gowrie to Regional Commissioner, entitled^
"Share of Land for Re-settlement of the Gowrie Inhabitants for
farming within the Gowrie/Vea Dam", Bongo, llth September, 1972.
59. The original Vea Land Allocation Committee consisted of the Re-
gional Commissioner as Chairman, the Regional Agricultural Of-
ficer, the Frafra District Chief Executive and the Bolga-naba.
However, it appears that the actual land allocation was done
by Regional Administrative officers or Vea project officers who
informed the Vea Land Allocation Committee of any allocation done.
60. See URADEP, Commercial Rice Production in the Upper Region, Farm
Management Division, April, 1979. Ref. no. URADEP/FO/FM/TRP/vol. 1.
61. Akanpatulsi, J.H.A., The Impact of Irrigation and Associated
Schemes on the Economy and Settlement Pattern of the Bolgatan-
ga Subregion, M.Sc. Thesis (Regional Planning), Kumasi: UST, Sep-
tember, 1977.
62. Labour Act Decree 1967 (NLC Decree 157).
63. Cox, E.W., Approaches to a Futurology of Industrial Relations,
in Bulletin of the ILLS, VIII, 1971.
64. See Hansen, E., and Collins, P., The Army, The State and the
"Rawlings Revolution" in Ghana, in African Affairs, vol. 79,
no. 314, January, 1980, pp. 3-23.
65. Letter Upper Regional Administration to Commercial Farmers and
State Corporations - Reallocation of Irrigated Land at Vea, Bol-
gatanga, 20th June 1979, in file UCR. 03/11A.
66. This factory, however, has hardly been activated till 1980, main-
ly because of underutilization of capacity and technical problems;
tomatoes had to be transported all the way to GIHOC's cannery at
Wenchi in the Brong-Ahafo Region. See Kaleem, A., The Importance
of Irrigation in Savannah Ghana, public lecture held at the 1980
Easter School of the Institute of Adult Education, Legon, at Bol-
gatanga.
-52-
67. Letter GIHOC Farms Ltd. to Regional Commissioner, Bolgatanga,
2/3/1979, ref. no. GF/CE/5/vol. l/lII.
68. Amin, S., Le Capitalisme et la Rente Foncière (la domination
du capitalisme sur l'agriculture), in Amin, S., and Vergopou-
los, K.,La Question Paysanne et le Capitaliflme, Paris, 1974.
For a critique, see Boesen, Jannik, On peasantry and the "Modes
of Production" Debate, in Review of African Political Economy,
nos. 15-16, 1979.
69. Ibid.; and Bromley, R., and Gerry, C., (eds.). Casual Work and
Poverty in Third World Cities, John Wiley and Sons, 1979.
70. Bernstein, H., Notes on Capital and Peasantry, in Review of Afri-
can Political Economy, no. 10, 1977, pp. 60-74; and Bernstein,
H., African Peasantries: A Theoretical Framework, in Journal of
Peasant Studies, VI, 4(1979).
71. See Bromley, R., and Gerry, C., (eds.), op. cit., 1979.
72. Peasants' resentment of tomato-group-farming for the agro-indus-
try is noted for Nigeria as well. See Agbonifo, P.O., and Cohen,
R., The Peasant Connection: a case study of the bureaucracy of
agro-industry, in Human Organization, vol. 35, no. 4, 1976, p. 372:
"Peasants indicated a desire for individualized holdings of to-
mato farms. They explained these desires by expressing mistrust
of the larger groups and a desire for fewer quarrels".
73. See Letter GIHOC Farms Ltd. to Regional Commissioner, Bolgatanga,
2/3/1979,ref.no. GF/CE/5/vol. l/III.
74. Memorandum on Land Allocation Tono and Vea Irrigation Projects by
Ag. General Manager (A.A. Kaleem) to the Ag. Chief Executive IDA,
12th April 1979, in file UCR 03/11A,
75. Hill, F., Experiments with a Public Sector Peasantry: Agricultu-
ral Scheines and Class Formation in Africa, in The African Studies
Review, XX, 3(1977), p. 27.
76. See Hutchful, E., op. cit., 1979; and Hansen, E., Food and Deve-
lopment: National Food Policies and Organizations in Ghana, pa-
per presented to the Third Annual Meeting of the Social Science
History Association held in Columbia, Ohio, November 3-5, 1978.
77. For a critique of the Vl|orld Bank's "new" philosophy, see Feder,
E., The New World Bank Programme and the Third World Peasantry,
in Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 3, 1975/76, pp. 343-54; and
Feder, E., Capitalism's last ditch effort to save underdeveloped
countries: international agro-business, the World Bank and the
rural poor, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 7, no. l, 1977.
78. World Bank, Appraisal of Upper Regional Agricultural Development
Project, Report no. 1061a-GH, Western Africa Regional Office,
June 3, 1976; for a concise criticism of the project, see Shep-
herd, A., The World Bank Project, in West Africa, 23 January 1978.
79. See file FDC 18/SF.l, General Complaints and Petitions.
80. See Report by the Committee on Ownership of Lands and Position
of Tenants in the Northern and Upper Region, unp. report, 1978; and
Report of the Committee on Allocation of Farm Lands in Builsa
District, unp. report, 1977.
81. See Hansen, E., and Collins, P., op. cit., 1980.
82. Memorandum on Land Allocation Tono and Vea Irrigation Projects
by Ag. General Manager (A.A. Kaleem) to the Ag. Chief Executive
IDA, 12th April 1979, in file UCR 03/11A.
83. Cowen, M.P., Capital, Class and Household Production, University'
of Nairobi: IDS, 1976 (mimeo). See also Raikes, P., The Develop-
ment of a Middle-Peasantry in Kenya, CDR Project Paper A. 78.3,
Copenhagen, October 1978.
-53-
84. Memorandum on Land Allocation Tono and Vea Irrigation Projects
by Ag. General Manager (A.A. Kaleem) to the Ag. Chief Executive
IDA, 12th April 1979; and Situational Report on Vea Irrigation
Project Interim Land Allocation Committee, in file UCR 03/11A.
By 4th May 1979 the reconstituted Land Allocation Committee had
received 94 applicationa for land from prospective commercial
farmers, but also from state and private corporations and in-
stitutions like schools.
85. See Mendonsa, E.L., Traditional and Imposed Political Systems
among the Sisala of Northern Ghana, in Savanna, vol. 4, no. 2,
December 1975.
86. Wolf, E., Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, New York, 1969,
p. XIV.
87. See Scott, J., The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and
Subsistence in Southeast Asia, New Haven, 1976.
88. Scott, J., op. cit., 1976; Wolf, E., op. cit., 1969; Moore, B.
Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston, 1966;
and Muller, V., The Revolutionary Fate of the Peasantry, in Dia-
lectical Anthropology, vol. 4, no. 3, 1979.
89. Wolf, E., op. cit., 1969, p. 268.
90. There is a conflict between the Gowrie and Vea chief about the
project's name; there is a conflict between the Yikine and Sum-
brungu chief about the traditional village land boundaries in
the project area; and there is a conflict between the Nyarega
no. l and the Nyarega no. 2 chief about their jurisdiction.
91. See Scott, J., op. cit., 1976, pp. 193-94.
92. See Wolf, E., op. cit., 1969; and Saul, J.S., African Peasants
and Revolution, in Review of African Political Economy, no. l,
1974, p. 43.
93. Schiphorst, F., The State and the Peasantry. A case study of a
rural development project in Ghana, a preliminary report, Am-
sterdam/Legon, 1980.
94. Petition presented by the Frafra Youth Movement: for a Review
of the Allocation of the Vea Dam Farmland, Bolgatanga, 28th
February 1977.
95. See Van Onselen, C., Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern
Rhodesia 1900-1973, London, 1976. For Ghana, see Konings, P.,
Political Consciousness and Political Action of Industrial Wor-
kers in Ghana: A Case Study of Valco Workers at Tema, in Buijten-
huijs, R., and Geschiere, P., (eds.), Stratification and Class
Formation, in African Perspectives, 1978/2, pp. 69-82; and
Konings, P., The Political Potential of Ghanaian Miners. A Case
Study of the AGC-Workers at Obuasi, Leiden: Afrika-Studiecentrum
Research Report no. 9, 1980.
96. See Bernstein, H., op. cit., 1979.
97. See Daily Grapfaic, 5 Maren, 1980; Ghanaian Times, 2 April, 1980;
and Weekly Spectator, 3 April 1980, reporting: "The rest (of the
rotting tomatoes, P.K.) are on the farms of people who have made
so much money during the beginning of the current tomato season
that they have abandoned harvesting the crops...."
p
p
p
Af rican Studies Centre, Stationsplein 10, 2312 AK Leiden, the Netherlands *
P
P
P
P
l
R
l
l
P
l
j
i
i
